We’re all blood brothers.

Posted in Uncategorized on March 13, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After long consideration and discussion with my family, I am saying goodbye to this blog and the law. I am retiring my law license and will be concentrating on making films, and writing music.

There is no lawyer, politician or judge who will change the world into what God intended it to be – one family, one love. Angels are real. It’s gonna be a full on landing soon.

Some are in the video at the following link.

“BLOOD BROTHERS”

ONE LOVE.

Leo Donofrio

 

 

The Mr. Binney Funeral Humiliates The Reputation Of The United States Supreme Court.

Posted in Uncategorized on February 7, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

The lack of historical analysis evident in every judicial opinion which has discussed Obama’s eligibility is staggering. If you compare Judge Malihi’s recent opinion in Georgia, and the Ankeny case from Indiana, to important citizenship decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, it becomes clear what separates the men from the boys. In a word; research.

U.S. Supreme Court opinions dodge nothing. Every issue is confronted head on. Every argument is taken into consideration, and even if they twist the facts and law to make it condone a blatant abuse of power, such as in the Kelo case, the Court doesn’t run away and hide from the most important obstacles placed in its path.

Of course, some of these decisions are obviously rigged to issue a pre-determined conclusion. The worst example of this is the racist holding in Scott v. Sandford. Still, the opinion doesn’t run and hide like a sissy from tough issues. But in confronting the racial issue, the Court gave itself and the nation a disease which led directly to civil war. This is what happens when the highest Court in the nation sells its soul. But even when the soul is sold, it’s sold with history and research that confronts the tough issues head on. You’re not left wondering what the Court thought about anything relevant to the case.

Another controversial opinion concerns U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. The majority opinion is 55 single spaced pages long, and the dissent weighs in at 27. The majority opinion was composed by Justice Horace Gray, aka – the Legal Historian of the Supreme Court, and Father of the Historical Method. At first glance, his opinion appears to have tracked down every relevant piece of information and law necessary to a proper resolution of the case.

Indeed, Gray goes all the way back to English statutes in 1351, continues through Calvin’s Case in 1608, and drives right to the newest state court cases of the day. Nothing was avoided. That depth of research is what made the Supreme Court an icon of justice, and is severely lacking from the flimsy opinions of lower courts that have weighed in on POTUS eligibility.

Bad ass research and an intellectual capacity to delicately do ballet thereupon is what makes the Supreme Court’s opinions stand out in contrast to their lower court peers. The SCOTUS gives the appearance of true legal authority. And it’s this patented appearance of legal authority that the stability of the nation is grounded upon.

When that appearance of authority was humiliated in the Dred Scott case, all hell literally broke loose upon this country.

Unfortunately, in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, we have the second worst piece of stinky refuse the Court has ever passed wind upon. And the appearance of true justice has once again been utterly humiliated. Consider that Justice Gray was appointed by Chester Arthur, a man born of an alien father. And in 1898, when Wong was decided, had the public at large, and the Court at large, known that Arthur was born a British subject in the U.S., then there would have been no need to determine the citizenship fate of anyone else born in the country to alien parentage.

If alien parentage didn’t stop old Chet from being President, why should it stop anyone else from being a citizen?

Yet, Justice Gray never mentions the citizenship status of the man who appointed him. Gray controlled his own fate by presiding over an opinion, the outcome of which decided the very legitimacy of his appointment to the Supreme Court. And the appearance of impartiality has been destroyed by this sordid history. Whether Justice Gray knew Arthur was born of alien parentage is not as important as the objective appearance.

This report continues the forensic investigation of whether Supreme Court Justice Horace Gray composed the infamous opinion in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark to subversively cure the citizenship defects – and accompanying POTUS eligibility defects – of the man who appointed him to the bench. President Chester Arthur successfully defrauded the nation as to his parental heritage which established him to have been a British subject at birth, since his father failed to naturalize in the U.S. until 1843, fourteen years after Chester was born.

Prior reports in this series discussed inexcusable misquotes with regard to Gray’s erroneous reliance upon McCreery v. Somerville, as well as the unexplained abandoning of his very own arguments and associated points of authority from Elk. v. Wilkins.

And in my Amicus Brief submitted in the recent Georgia Ballot challenges, I offered evidence that other Supreme Court opinions were abused by Justice Gray who cleverly distorted them to mean the exact opposite of what the Court actually held.

MR. BINNEY’S INFAMOUS “PAPER”.

Today, we shall strip another foundational building block from the opinion in Wong Kim Ark.  I refer to the mysterious “paper” written by Philadelphia attorney, Horace Binney, in 1853.  My research has revealed that his paper, The Alienigenae of the United States Under the Present Naturalization Laws, was published in three editions, not two, as was erroneously suggested by Justice Gray. Furthermore, Gray’s suggested chronology of publication is false.

The most important section of Binney’s paper, as it relates to Justice Gray’s opinion from Wong Kim Ark, was deleted in the third and final revision, while Justice Gray wrongly suggested that the second edition was the final one, thereby appearing to justify his reliance upon it. This is absolutely false.

The deleted section of the Binney paper was relied upon, and quoted by Gray twice in the Wong Kim Ark opinion. He quotes the passage in the body of the opinion, as well as in the very holding of the case. While Justice Gray acknowledges that the passage did not appear in the peer-reviewed American Law Register (precursor to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) version, he suggests that the ALR version was the first edition, and that it came before the second edition relied upon by the Court so heavily in Wong Kim Ark. As you will see below, Justice Gray got that very very wrong. My research has now established with absolute certainty that the ALR version was the third and final version of the Binney paper.

Mr. Binney and his editors at the ALR deleted the infamous passage relied upon by Justice Gray in the Wong Kim Ark opinion. It did not survive the peer review process and was gutted in the third and final edition of the paper. Furthermore, the necessity for their being three versions of the same paper – all published within three months of each other – was caused by two consecutive screw ups by Binney in quoting the U.S. Naturalization Act of 1790. As we shall discuss in detail below, Binney not only misquoted the statute in the first edition, but he compounded the error by applying speculative analysis to the statute as if it contained the misquoted provision.

Imagine analysis of a statute which does not exist. That’s exactly what happened in the first edition. Then, in the second edition (relied upon so heavily by Justice Gray), Binney appears to have offered the infamous page-long footnote (on pg. 22 of the paper) as a counter-analysis to the first edition’s mistaken conclusions. Unfortunately, Mr. Binney failed to correct the misquote in the second edition as well.

Both the first and second editions, therefore, contain analysis of a statutory provision which did not exist. This, of course, makes the analysis useless. It’s based upon a fictional statutory provision, so the analysis of that non-existent provision cannot be a legal authority for anything, let alone the majority opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in the very case which set our citizenship path for the last 114 years.

In the third and final edition of the paper, as published by the ALR, Binney’s name was deleted along with that part of the footnote relied upon twice by Justice Gray. Welcome to the wonderful world of Wong Kim Ark.

We have the sad reality of the highest court in the nation relying upon – in the most important citizenship decision in our national history – a legal authority which was deleted by the concerned author and his esteemed editors. When we add this new evidence to all of the other anomalies in the Wong Kim Ark opinion, as framed by the strange history of Chester Arthur’s citizenship status, the stench becomes unbearable. And the current United States Supreme Court should really clean it up.

ACKNOWLEDGED OBSCURITY OF THE BINNEY PAPER.

Binney was no stranger to controversy. His paper on Habeas Corpus advocated for the Government’s right to strip this most precious jewel of liberty from the populace when it saw fit. That paper was criticized heavily by his peers (although today’s federal mafia would salivate over it).

But the paper which Justice Gray relies upon, “The Alienigenae of the United States Under the Present Naturalization Laws“, self-published by Binney in Philadelphia (1853), did start upon a valid point. It reiterated the sentiment from prior authorities, which explained that there was no statute in place to naturalize the children born abroad of U.S. citizens. Binney’s paper sought to influence a correction of the law. And in 1855, the law was corrected.

JUSTICE GRAY’S EXALTED RESEARCH.

Justice Gray was a titan of the historical method, famously known as the pre-eminent historian of the Supreme Court, to which great tales have been told concerning his legendary research skills. And his knowledge of the Binney paper was apparently far advanced from that of the attorneys litigating WKA. Ark’s attorneys were not able, in 1898 – almost fifty years after Binney published the paper – to establish with any certainty that Binney had written the paper, and it was Justice Gray who was finally able to do it for them in his opinion from WKA.

There is a telling anecdote about the obscurity of Binney’s paper, memorialized by Ark’s attorney, J. Hubley Ashton, Esq., in Great American Lawyers, Volume 8:

“There was cited in the argument for the appellee in that case a paper of remarkable ability on the ‘Alienigenae of the United States’, published many years ago in the American Law Register, which had always and universally been attributed by lawyers and judges to Horace Binney, although his name was not appended to the article. As one of the counsel for the appellee, I made considerable effort to ascertain before the argument whether the great lawyer of Philadelphia had ever formally acknowledged this paper as his own, but the search for information on the subject was unavailing. My surprise was almost humiliating, I remember when I saw in the opinion of the court delivered by Mr Justice Gray, a passage with a note, from what was described by him as tha second edititon of this paper, ‘printed in pamphlet form at Philadelphia with a preface bearing Mr Binney’s signature and the date of December 1st 1853′, accompanied by the following observation of the learned judge:  ‘This paper without Mr Binney’s name, and with the note in a less complete form, and not containing the passage last cited, was published (perhaps from the first edition) in the American Law Register for February 1854.’ I was naturally curious to know where and how Mr Justice Gray had found this rare pamphlet, no copy of which appeared to be in any department of the Library of Congress. He told me that although he had no doubt from internal evidence and otherwise that the paper referred to was the authentic work of Mr Binney, he was indisposed to cite it as such in the opinion of the Supreme Court upon mere tradition or general belief on the subject, and that as a result of a search among some old pamphlets purchased by him many years ago, and stored away in his private library, he found the pamphlet described in his opinion, which established, of course, the authorship of the learned paper contained in it.” Id. pg. 169-170. (Emphasis added.)

So, 55 years after Binney’s paper was first released, the Library of Congress didn’t even have the original editions of the paper. The only person who did have them, according to this anecdote, was Justice Gray. He apparently had the second edition tucked away in his private library. But what about the first edition? If he was in possession of that, then his entire opinion in Wong Kim Ark is proved to be a fraud. If he knew of the true first edition, his suggestion that the ALR version was the first edition would be outright fraud. Keep this in mind as we move along to examine the text of each edition.

But first, let me stoke your paranoia. One of my favorite films is “The Ninth Gate”, wherein Johnny Depp plays a seedy rare book collector/charlatan. The plot concerns a Satanic coven, and the leader is a rich magnate who seeks to gather the only three remaining copies of an esoteric text. Depp’s character discovers, by comparing the copies, that the illustrations are ever so slightly different copy to copy. Some of them are signed by “LCF”, some not. This turns out to be Lucifer.

Besides Justice Gray’s infamous misleading quote from Binney appearing on pg. 666 of the Wong Kim Ark opinion, spookier anomalies have popped up throughout my research of the natural-born citizen issue. Of course, JustiaGate takes the prize and sets the standard for this kind of freaky malevolence. But just now it happened again with regard to the passage just quoted from the Great American Lawyers text. I downloaded the book from Google Books about eight weeks ago. And it’s to that downloaded copy that I have provided a link to above. The text is in the public domain and therefore, as of eight weeks ago, the entire book was available as a preview, and as a download from this link.

Well, it’s a good thing I downloaded it then, because as of today, Google has Justiafied the text, so that pg. 170 has been clipped from both the preview, and the downloadable version. The part about Justice Gray having the Binney paper in his private library has been scrubbed by Google as of today. Download the Google copy and compare it to the copy available here at my blog. They do not match. And this development has taken place recently, since I downloaded the full copy from Google Books just a few weeks ago. What a freak show, America. Raise the lights, dim the Twilight Zone theme, and let’s get down to business.

THE EVIDENCE.

Binney, after having published the first edition of the paper must have become acutely aware of his screw up, and quickly published a second edition which added an infamous footnote which sought to alleviate the erroneous analysis based upon the incorrect statutory quotation. Binney, however, failed to inform the reader that the note was required due to the misquote. The second edition, therefore, contains a footnote which changes the analysis of the statute. Unfortunately, the second edition also failed to correct the misquote.

This must have doubled the embarrassment of Binney, who was a very upright character. I have been to the Philadelphia Historical Society to read his personal papers, and handwritten memoirs, which illustrate he was a very decent man. I do not wish to sully his reputation, but the reputation of the paper in question, as relied upon by Gray, deserves stern negative critique. And Binney’s failure to allow his name to appear on the ALR version justifies the criticism.

I never understood why an obscure paper, rather than prior decisions of the Supreme Court, should have provided the backbone for Gray’s opinion. Up until Wong Kim Ark, there were multiple U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which held that minor children follow the political status (aka citizenship status) of their parents (see my Amicus Brief at 31-39), and that birth on the soil did not necessarily confer citizenship, unless the parents were themselves citizens. Two decisions which held America to this principle were, Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, and Shanks v. Dupont, to which Justice Gray failed to acknowledge the majority holdings, as they directly conflicted with his opinion in WKA.

But now it has become clear that even Binney’s obscure paper should provide no support at all for Justice Gray’s opinion in Wong Kim Ark.

The footnote quoted by Justice Gray in Wong Kim Ark does not appear in the first edition of Mr. Binney’s paper. You may examine the first edition at this link to Harvard’s online collection. Additonally, I have extracted the pamphlet from a collection of Binney’s writings made available by Widener University. The full text of that document is here. And I have extracted the first edition of Binney’s paper, and uploaded it here. Go to pg. 22, that is where the statute is misquoted, as follows:

“[T]hat the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States shall be considered as natural born citizens – with a proviso, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons who had never been resident in the United States. 2 US Laws 83.” 

The proviso from the actual statute, however, did not require that the persons born overseas be resident in the U.S. It required that the fathers of such persons must have resided in the country:

Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons, whose fathers have never been resident in the United States…”

Binney then went on to analyze the statute as if the misquote was genuine:

“[T]he proviso did not apply to citizens naturalized under that Act, who must have been resident within the United States at the time of their naturalization, but only to such native citizens, or citizens naturalized by British law, as had left the country before or during the Revolution and had never returned.”

This analysis is awkward, and does not appear to make any sense with regard to British law. Binney recognized that, and quickly published a second edition, which contains the footnote cited by Justice Gray. I have uploaded the second edition here. The footnote takes up most of pg. 20, continuing on pg.21. Justice Gray quoted from it as follows:

“Mr. Binney in the second edition of a paper on the Alienigenae of the United States, printed in pamphlet at Philadelphia, with a preface bearing his signature and the date of December 1, 1853, said: ‘The common- law principle of allegiance was the law of all the states at the time of the Revolution and at the adoption of the constitution; and by that principle the citizens of the United States are, with the exceptions before mentioned [namely, foreign-born children of citizens, under statutes to be presently referred to], such only as are either born or made so, born within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, or naturalized by the authority of law, either in one of the states before the constitution, or, since that time, by virtue of an act of the congress of the United States.’ Page 20. ‘The right of citizenship never descends in the legal sense, either by the common law, or under the common naturalization acts. It is incident to birth in the country, or it is given personally by statute. The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.’ Page 22, note. This paper, without Mr. Binney’s name, and with the note in a less complete form, and not containing the passage last cited, was published (perhaps from the first edition) in the American Law Register for February, 1854. 2 Am. Law Reg. 193, 203, 204.” U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 665-666 (1898). (Emphasis added.)

The second edition, however, while supplying the note, also contains the exact same statutory misquote as the first edition. Additionally, Justice Gray got his facts very wrong in the bold print part quoted above. The note from the peer-reviewed ALR edition is the third and final edition, and the note, therefore, is in its complete form in that edition, whereas the second edition contains a longer note, but that note is based upon the statutory misquote, and is, therefore, not the final note.

Justice Gray’s suggestion that the ALR was the first edition is proved false by the fact that the ALR edition finally gets the statute right, and the note attached to the ALR edition makes sense when read in light of the correct statute. I have uploaded the ALR version here. Go to pg. 12, and you will see that the statute now reflects the true proviso, which requires the fathers to have been resident. The note in the ALR version appears on pg. 13, and you can see that the following passage was stripped from the final edition:

“The right of citizenship never descends in the legal sense, either by the common law, or under the common naturalization acts. It is incident to birth in the country, or it is given personally by statute. The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.”

  Justice Gray relied on this deleted, and discredited passage, not only on pgs. 665-666 of the Wong Kim Ark opinion, but he also relied on it in the holding, on pg. 693.

The first edition was published in December, 1853. The second edition appears to also have been published in December 1853, as was noted by Justice Gray. The ALR edition was published in Feb. 1854, and is the only edition to have correctly quoted the statute.

That Binney screwed it up twice, must have been the reason his name didn’t appear on the ALR edition. The prior versions contain analysis based upon a statutory provision which did not exist. That analysis drove Binney to quickly publish a second edition, but in doing so he just made it worse.

Justice Gray relied upon this paper multiple times in the Wong Kim Ark opinion, specifically citing the discredited quotes twice. The errors which caused Binney’s first two papers to require these misguided quotations to be removed from the final edition were caught in peer review, and stripped from the third edition. The ALR version is certainly the third and final edition, not the first as was suggested by Gray.

This revelation leaves us with a very rotten opinion from Wong Kim Ark that has determined our national citizenship policy, which, as can be seen from the lack of research applied to it by the lower courts reviewing Obama’s eligibility (none of which mentioned any of the clear errors made by Justice Gray, and pointed out here at this blog), continues to have broad ranging implications that directly touch national security with regard to who is eligible to be commander in chief.

The analysis I have provided in this report, when added to the rest of the sad story concerning Justice Gray’s many errors of law and fact as shadowed by the Chester Arthur controversy, leaves the nation’s highest court looking either corrupt, or stupid. If Justice Gray was aware of the true chronology of the three versions of Binney’s paper, he is guilty of directly, and purposely, defrauding the nation. If he was guilty of negligence, that’s almost just as bad. The U.S. Supreme Court is not supposed to look this bad.

The Wong Kim Ark opinion looks very bad, America.

Leo Donofrio, Esq.

[See commenting rules here.]

A Rat Called Tandem.

Posted in Uncategorized on February 4, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

[UPDATED: 2:12 PM - Cindy Simpson's top headline article at American Thinker is also a must read. Excellent analysis as usual.]

What happened in Georgia is what we refer to in poker as, “playing to a script”. It’s like something out of a Frank Capra movie. The citizens head to court to fix a Constitutional wrong, and the State court appears to be tough on the feds, standing up to them bravely flexing their muscles in the name of their citizens. Nice script. But it’s so very transparent.

Everyone needs to read Mario Apuzzo’s in-depth exposure of the blatant flaws in Judge Malihi’s holding, wherein you will experience a brilliant researcher exposing a truly defective legal opinion.

I only have a little bit to add. My remarks will be brief, and focused upon Judge Malihi’s sad failure to address the issue of statutory construction, which I explained thoroughly in my last report, The Dirty “little” Secret of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause Revealed.

Malihi’s opinion directly contradicts his own recent opinion denying Obama’s Motion to Dismiss, wherein Malihi relied exclusively on statutory construction. However, yesterday, Malihi held that the 14th Amendment had to be read “in tandem” with Article 2, Section 1.

But doing so would render the natural-born citizen clause to be inoperative, in that 14th Amendment citizenship, and nothing more, would be the requirement to be President. This would mean that the natural-born citizen clause is rendered superfluous. Here’s what Chief Justice Marshall said about this issue in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803):

“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Id. 174. (Emphasis added.)

And here’s what the U.S. Supreme Court held as to statutory construction in the seminal case on this issue, Morton v. Mancari:

“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. See, e. g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87 -89 (1902). 

The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. “When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . The intention of the legislature to repeal `must be clear and manifest.’ ” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1974).

There is no “clearly expressed intention” to deem 14th Amendment citizens “natural born”. Those words were intentionally left out of the 14th Amendment. And Judge Malihi has simply overruled the U.S. Supreme Court by suggesting that the general citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment governs the specific requirement to be President in Article 2, Section 1.

Both clauses are not given separate effect by Malihi. His opinion holds that the 14th has the exact same effect as the natural-born citizen clause, while the 14th Amendment does not include the words “natural born Citizen”. Persons claiming citizenship under the 14th Amendment are deemed to be “citizens”. Malihi has added the words “natural born” into the Amendment. This is absolutely forbidden, according to Malihi’s own opinion in the Motion to dismiss, wherein he held:

“In the absence of words of limitation, words in a statute should be given their ordinary and everyday meaning.’ Six Flags Over Ga. v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211 (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because there is no other ‘natural and reasonable construction’ of the statutory language, this Court is ‘not authorized either to read into or to read out that which would add to or change its meaning.’ ” (Emphasis added.)

Yeah, dude. Whatevah. Such lack of consistency, just weeks apart, from the same jurist… simply reeks. Now he’s putting words into the 14th Amendment, when just two weeks ago he said that was forbidden.

“EVER GET THE FEELING YOU’VE BEEN CHEATED?”

 

Leo Donofrio, Esq.

[See commenting rules here.]

The Dirty “little” Secret Of The Natural Born Citizen Clause Revealed.

Posted in Uncategorized on January 27, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

I have emphasized the word “little” because the truth of the law on this issue is very simple, folks. So simple that the mystery is deciphered by application of one of the most clear, concise and undeniable rules of law; the code of statutory construction governs, and therefore, “natural born Citizen” must require something more than being born in the United States.

Let me put it to you in appropriately simple language:

Clause A = “Only a natural born Citizen may be President.”

Clause B = “Anyone born in the United States is a Citizen.”

(While these two clauses reflect Article 2, Section 1, and the 14th Amendment, I shall refer to them as “Clause A” and “Clause B” for now.)

The code of statutory construction is learned by every student in law school, and every practicing attorney has confronted it. Every judge is required to apply the rule equally to all statutes, and the Constitution. There is no wiggle room at all. The rule states that when a court examines two clauses, unless Congress has made it clear that one clause repeals the other, the court must observe a separate legal effect for each. More specifically, regardless of the chronology of enactment, the general clause can never govern the specific.

Clause B is a general rule of citizenship, which states that all persons born in the country are members of the nation.

Clause A is a specific clause that says only those members of the nation who are “natural born” may be President.

According to the rule of statutory construction, the court must determine that Clause A requires something more than Clause B.

It’s truly that simple. This is not some crazy conspiracy theory. It’s not controversial. This is not rocket science. Every single attorney reading this right now knows, beyond any shadow of a doubt, that I have accurately explained the rule of statutory construction to you. Any attorney who denies this rule, is lying. The rule cannot be denied. And its simplicity cannot be ignored.

Now let’s see what the United States Supreme Court has to say about the rule:

“Where there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. See, e. g., Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961); Rodgers v. United States, 185 U.S. 83, 87 -89 (1902). 

The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective. “When there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible . . . The intention of the legislature to repeal `must be clear and manifest.’ ” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1974).

This is what I mean by no wiggle room – “The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments…”  Any court construing Clause A is not at liberty to assume that Congress intended to put the words “natural born” into Clause B. The general does not govern the specific, and the rule requires the court to “give effect to both if possible”.

Is it possible to give separate effect to both Clause A and Clause B?

Yes. The Constitution tells us that any Citizen can be a Senator, or Representative, but that to be President one must be a “natural born Citizen”. The Constitution specifically assigns different civic statuses to “Citizens” and “natural born Citizens”. Therefore, not only is it possible to give separate effect to both Clause A and Clause B, it is absolutely required by law, and no court has the ability to circumvent the rule.

Had the original framers intended for any “born Citizen” to be eligible to the office of President, they would not have included the word “natural” in the clause. Additionally, had the framers of the 14th Amendment intended to declare that every person born in the country was a “natural born Citizen”, then the 14th Amendment would contain clear and manifest language to that effect. But it doesn’t. Therefore, each clause must be given separate force and effect.

Deputy Chief Judge Malihi explained the rule of statutory construction in his denial of candidate Obama’s Motion to Dismiss, wherein his opinion of the Court stated:

“Statutory provisions must be read as they are written, and this Court finds that the cases cited by Defendant are not controlling. When the Court construes a constitutional or statutory provision, the ‘first step   . . . is to examine the plain statutory language.’ Morrison v. Claborn, 294 Ga. App. 508, 512 (2008). ‘Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden. In the absence of words of limitation, words in a statute should be given their ordinary and everyday meaning.’ Six Flags Over Ga. v. Kull, 276 Ga. 210, 211 (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because there is no other ‘natural and reasonable construction’ of the statutory language, this Court is ‘not authorized either to read into or to read out that which would add to or change its meaning.‘ Blum v. Schrader, 281 Ga. 238, 240 (2006) (quotation marks omitted).” Order On Motion To Dismiss, Deputy Chief Judge Malihi, Jan. 3, 2012, pg. 3. (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, the term “natural born” must be considered as requiring something more than simple birth in the country. And Judge Malihi states, quite clearly, in his ruling above, that the Court “is not authorized to read into or to read out that which would add to or change its meaning.” The rule is the same for election statutes in Georgia as it is for the Constitution of the United States.

The rule of statutory construction, with regard to the Constitution, was best stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803):

“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.” Id. 174. (Emphasis added.)

If the 14th Amendment was held to declare that all persons born in the country, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, were natural-born citizens, then the “natural born Citizen” clause would be rendered inoperative. It would be superfluous. And its specific provision would, therefore, be governed by the general provision of the 14th Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has determined that it is inadmissible to even make that argument.

Any genuine construction of the “natural born Citizen” clause must begin from the starting point that it requires something more than citizenship by virtue of being born on U.S. soil. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), tells you exactly what that something is; citizen parents.

Leo Donofrio, Esq.

[For a more detailed analysis of this issue, please see my Amicus Brief entered in the Georgia POTUS eligibility cases.]

[See commenting rules here.]

The Current INS Officially Recognizes A Delineation Between Natural-Born and Native-Born.

Posted in Uncategorized on January 25, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

I was just made privy to a very important piece of research I had not previously been aware of. It comes by way of a comment forwarded to me by the author of the h2ooflife blog:

“I had presumed that the idiom “natural born citizen” appeared nowhere in U.S. Law other than A2S1C5, but I found it in administrative law and it is contrasted with native and naturalized citizenship. I’ve never seen any mention of this fact before and wonder how many are aware of it in the ineligibility camp. Here’s the quotes:
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-45077/0-0-0-48575.html

He then quoted two provisions from the link provided, but there’s actually three at the official INS “.gov” site which establish official recognition by the federal government that native-born and natural-born should be separately delineated. When you visit the suggested link to the Immigration and Naturalization service, it brings you to “Interpretation 324.2 Reacquisition of citizenship lost by marriage.” 

Interpretation 324.2 (a)(3) provides:

“The repatriation provisions of these two most recent enactments also apply to a native- and natural-born citizen woman who expatriated herself by marriage to an alien…” (Emphasis added.)

Then, Interpretation 324.2(a)(7) provides:

“(7) Restoration of citizenship is prospective . Restoration to citizenship under any one of the three statutes is not regarded as having erased the period of alienage that immediately preceded it.

The words “shall be deemed to be a citizen of the United States to the same extent as though her marriage to said alien had taken place on or after September 22, 1922″, as they appeared in the 1936 and 1940 statutes, are prospective and restore the status of native-born or natural-born citizen (whichever existed prior to the loss) as of the date citizenship was reacquired.” (Emphasis added.)

And again, Interpretation 324.2(b) provides:

“The effect of naturalization under the above statutes was not to erase the previous period of alienage, but to restore the person to the status if naturalized, native, or natural-born citizen, as determined by her status prior to loss.” (Emphasis added.)

http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-45077/0-0-0-48575.html

Three times in this official INS Interpretation – currently published by the Obama Administration – native-born and natural-born are given separate consideration. And in the third example – from Interpretation 324.2(b) – the INS clearly states that each delineation, “naturalized, native, or natural-born citizen“, is a separate status.

The INS includes the following explanation of Interpretations:

“Interpretations were created to supplement and clarify the provisions of the statute and regulations as interpreted by the courts. These materials usually are not included in the regulations because they deal generally with procedural matters and do not deal directly with application and benefit requirements. They are still a useful tool to help you understand how the DHS Bureaus performs their different immigration services and enforcement functions. Users of the Operation Instructions and Interpretations should always consult the relevant regulations and manuals in conjunction with these materials. As the DHS Bureaus have grown, the trend has been towards inclusion of more materials in the regulations and field manuals, and the Operations Instructions and Interpretations have been updated less frequently.”

I am rather rocked by this find, having never seen it before, and it certainly comes to the attention of the nation at a critical moment, one day before the Georgia POTUS eligibility hearings. I do have a policy of only printing comments from attorneys, but I did say in the comment rules that I would be happy to read messages from anyone. Since this research is new to me, and directly relevant to a proper analysis of the natural-born citizen clause, I have made an exception in posting this comment.

However, I must stress that I do not agree with some things at the h2ooflife blog. While I haven’t had the time to examine everything there, I must point out the following, and zealously dispute it:

“The First U.S. Congress included in the 1790 Immigration & Naturalization Act language to alert the State Department to the fact that Americans born abroad are (“natural born” citizens”  and are not to be viewed as foreigners due to foreign birth.  They were not granted citizenship via that US statute, rather their automatic citizenship was stated as a fact that must be recognized by immigration authorities.  They were not citizens by any other means than natural law, and statutory law was written to insure that their natural citizenship was recognized.”

This is not a reasonable explanation. It fails to recognize that Congress only has powers over naturalization. Congress has no power to define “natural born Citizen”, which has nothing to do with naturalization. Furthermore, if Congress wants to tell the State Department something, they don’t have to enact legislation to do it.

But more important is that all of the following naturalization acts, 1795, 1802, etc., were also passed to naturalize the children of U.S. citizens born abroad. And the words “natural born” were repealed in the 1795 Naturalization Act and never returned again.

In Rogers. v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that persons born abroad are not covered by the 14th Amendment, and therefore, their citizenship can be stripped from them by Congress, whereas Congress cannot strip citizenship from a 14th Amendment citizen, whether born or naturalized here:

“Mr. Justice Gray has observed that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was “declaratory of existing rights, and affirmative of existing law,” so far as the qualifications of being born in the United States, being naturalized in the United States, and being subject to its jurisdiction are concerned. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S., at 688 . Then follows a most significant sentence:

 “But it [the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment] has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.”

Thus, at long last, there emerged an express constitutional definition of citizenship. But it was one restricted to the combination of three factors, each and all significant: birth in the United States, naturalization in the United States, and subjection to the jurisdiction of the United States. The definition obviously did not apply to any acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of an American parent. That type, and any other not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, was necessarily left to proper congressional action…

Further, it is conceded here both that Congress may withhold citizenship from persons like plaintiff Bellei and may prescribe a period of residence in the United States as a condition precedent without constitutional question.

Thus we have the presence of congressional power in this area, its exercise, and the Court’s specific recognition of that power and of its having been properly withheld or properly used in particular situations.” Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 830-831. (Emphasis added.)

Naional law has always required persons born abroad to be naturalized, whether born of citizen parents or not. Furthermore, those born abroad to citizen parents are subject to conditions precedent which Congress may impose upon them in order for them to remain U.S. citizens, whereas Congress has no such power over natural-born citizens, native-born citizens, or citizens naturalized in the U.S.

Again, not only are children of citizens born abroad not natural-born, the Supreme Court has held that their citizenship is subject to being stripped by Congress, since the Constitution does not directly provide for their citizenship, as it does for those born or naturalized in the United States.

I do not appreciate the author’s argument on this point. It is definitely wrong.

Regardless, the research provided as to the INS Interpretations is superb and greatly appreciated. Well done, sir.

Adding these official Interpretations of the INS, published at the official “.gov” site, to the Supreme Court’s opinion from Minor v. Happersett, the true Constitutional definition of  a natural-born citizen, as one born in the country to citizen parents, is further reinforced.

Like the Obama administration’s prior scrubbing of the Foreign Affairs Manual, on August 21, 2009, the INS web site appears due for a cut and die at the salon.

Leo Donofrio, Esq.

[See commenting rules here.]

The English Common Law Definition of Natural Law Is Not Part Of The Law Of Nations.

Posted in Uncategorized on January 24, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

Some have written to ask me whether the Law of Nations is based on natural law, and whether this creates a contradiction to my argument in the Amicus Brief I have submitted in the Georgia POTUS eligibility cases. The answer is no, it is not a contradiction in any way, shape or form. And here’s why:

Customs of international law have developed over millenia as nations have confronted each other. These customs created international law, aka, the Law of Nations.

The Law of Nations respects the sovereignty of each nation, and each nation’s right to worship God as they please, or not to worship God at all. When this custom is violated, wars are inevitable. Natural law under the Law of Nations, therefore, must be non-denominational (including Atheism).

Furthermore, Vattel’s famous treatise didn’t create the Law of Nations. His text is an observation of customs that developed between nations, such customs going back centuries well before Christ walked the Earth.

Christian nations, Atheist nations, Islamic nations, etc., all respect customs of the Law of Nations, but they do not share the same concepts of natural law. To a Pagan, nature is God. To a Marxist/Atheist, science is God. And so on… But all nations do agree that procreation is part of nature.

The English common law was absolutely Christian, and their entire system of Government was based upon their unique view of natural law being issued directly from Jesus Christ as enforced by the English monarch.

I am a Christian, but I do not want religion being established in our government. Jesus said, “Give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and give unto God what is God’s.”

Those who believe in Christ, believe natural law emanates from Christ, and those who believe in Allah, believe natural law emanates from Allah. The same is true for those who worship the sun, or the elements, or the stars.

The English common law has Christ at the head of its government, with the King as his main man on Earth. That was the rule of natural law for their nation. Other nations had different concepts of natural law. Again, to a Marxist/Atheist nation, science is natural law. So, with regard to the international community as governed by the Law of Nations, natural law is non-denominational, and even non-spiritual for Atheist nations.

There is a fundamental distinction between natural law in the international community, and natural law under the English common law.

Our Constitution forbids the establishment of religion, while respecting the rights of all persons to worship God or nature as they like. The English common law is in direct polar opposition to our Constitution, in that infidels were considered enemies of the state.  In Calvin’s Case, which is universally recognized as having established the English common law with regard to the jus soli rule, the decision makes it perfectly clear that the English common law presumed infidels would never be converted to Christianity, and it specifically states that they are subjects of devils.

Hence, one could be born on English soil, in the King’s castle even, to parents who loved the King, but if the parents weren’t Christian, they could not be natural-born subjects. Instead, they were considered enemies of the King, because they refused to believe that the King was God’s monarch on Earth. This is not “natural law” to anyone who wasn’t Christian.

The English common law’s uniquely Christian definition of natural law governs the English common law concept of natural subjection/natural allegiance.  And that is why the English common law definition of “natural-born subject” can never be judicially recognized as synonymous with “natural-born citizen”. Such a construction of Article 2, Section 1, would be directly repugnant to the 1st Amendment.

IT COMES DOWN TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Perhaps due to the sensitivity of the spiritual concepts discussed in my Amicus brief, people have not been as focused upon my first point in the brief, which is the most important point, and it’s the simplest as well.

The rules of statutory construction in this nation forbid the construction of any clause in the Constitution that renders another clause inoperative. Each clause, and each word of each clause, must be given separate and unique meaning. When the legislature enacted the 14th Amendment, it did not include the word “natural”. The Amendment states that persons born in the country, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens. It does not say that they are natural-born citizens.

The legislature could have drafted the amendment so that those born here were deemed to be “natural born Citizens”, but the legislature didn’t. And our federal courts are barred, according to the rules of statutory construction, from holding that the 14th Amendment creates natural-born citizens. Had Congress intended the Amendment to do that, their intention to do so must have been clear and manifest. Therefore, such a construction is not only wrong, it is inadmissible according to Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Marbury v. Madison.

The issue now confronting the nation as to the true Constitutional meaning and intention of the natural-born citizen clause is not as complex as it appears. When one analyzes it in the context of the firmly established rules of statutory construction, it becomes clear that 14th Amendment citizenship is not, by itself, enough to be POTUS eligible. In order for a court to hold that 14th Amendment citizenship alone makes one a natural-born citizen, the court would be required to completely overrule the very foundation of law in this country; checks and balances created by the separation of powers.

Perhaps the judicial branch is willing to do that to protect President Obama from the Constitution’s authority. But in doing so, the judiciary would destroy our legal system. This is because such a construction would be a complete usurpation by the judicial branch of the power granted by the Constitution to Congress.

Therefore, the only possible way to Constitutionally construe the natural-born citizen clause is to require something more than 14th Amendment citizenship. That something more is citizen parentage. And that is exactly how the Supreme Court construed it in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).

 

Leo Donofrio, Esq.

[See commenting rules here.]

AMICUS BRIEF – Georgia POTUS Eligibility Cases.

Posted in Uncategorized on January 23, 2012 by naturalborncitizen

[UPDATED: 1:23 PM - SCRIBD download for Amicus Brief.]

This morning, I filed an AMICUS BRIEF in the Georgia POTUS eligibility cases. The brief complies with all Rules and procedures of the Administrative Court.  The brief is 54 pages, and the appendix is 155 pages. The Rules of Court require attachment to the brief of all legal authorities, other than those issued by the federal government, or the State of Georgia. There’s some very esoteric law attached thereto.

I seriously urge everyone to familiarize themselves with Lord Coke’s Report from Calvin’s Case, as well as Chancellor Ellesmere’s argument, also in Calvin’s Case, for this is the true common law genesis of jus soli subjection, which happens to be a uniquely Christian tenet of law that has been completely misunderstood in this country for too long now. Calvin’s Case is universally recognized as the common law precedent relating to jus soli, but it is so much more fascinating than you can imagine. And it will forever revolutionize understanding of the words “natural-born”.

This book contains all of the relevant arguments and reports. But the original text of Lord Coke’s Report is the proper starting point. (This document is also in the appendix to my brief.) And here’s another source with slightly modernized English and extras.

You may download the AMICUS BRIEF here.

Leo Donofrio, Esq.

[See commenting rules here.]