IT’S TIME FOR A WRIT QUO WARRANTO, PRESIDENT TRUMP.

Here’s the punchline up front: Biden can be ousted from Office by a Writ of Quo Warranto as determined by a civil jury. This is not a fairy-tale. This is not a “Hail Mary”. This is the proper legal procedure our government provides for erroneous or fraudulent elections. And President Trump will have a much better chance of succeeding if he starts the process before Biden is inaugurated. Spread this post everywhere fast. This action needs to be filed yesterday.

If the State Legislatures moved faster in early November, they could have appointed electors then. Biden would have run to SCOTUS and lost. That didn’t happen, but the Legislatures are moving fast now. Pence could have bought them more time. But Pence has failed us. All he had to do is kick it back to the Legislatures for a few days. Instead he gaslighted America by indicating that President Trump asked him to “unilaterally” override the Constitution. No he didn’t. He asked Pence to obey the Constitution over a statute.

The unconstitutional Electoral Count Act of 1887 is virtually unreadable. Nobody understands it. Nobody can say if it’s even a statute or a legislative rule. (Don’t believe me? Read this.) But we certainly know that it does not override the Constitution, which grants the Legislatures plenary authority over who gets the electors. So why didn’t Pence let Biden run to SCOTUS for help? Because Pence is a sad creature of politics. He is as deep state entrenched as you can possibly get. Just ask General Flynn. I haven’t trusted Pence since he threw Flynn to the wolves.

It’s truly a blessing that state legislatures are coming around to see the actual fraud in their states, and it’s not too late to right the ship. President Trump can institute a statutory Writ of Quo Warranto. This is a rarely tested federal statute that gives Trump a genuine chance for a jury to decide whether the election was stolen.

THE FEDERAL QUO WARRANTO STATUTE

Chapter 35 from The Code of the District of Columbia is entitled “Quo Warranto”. § 16–3501 states:

“A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or military. The proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.”

The President is a public officer of the United States. If the President obtained the office by fraudulent means, or by mistake in the electing process then he unlawfully holds the office, and a Writ of Quo Warranto may be issued to oust him from that office.

§ 16-3502 of the Quo Warranto statute states that the proceeding may be instituted by the Attorney General or the U.S. Attorney without leave of the District Court. That means if Trump moves fast – before Biden puts a new AG in – the current AG or U.S. Attorney may bring the action without seeking a Judge’s permission. If Attorney General Rosen and U.S. Attorney Sherwin are unwilling to bring the case, then Trump can petition for leave of the District Court on his own relation under § 16-3503. If the District Court allows Trump to bring it, any attorney can act in the name of the United States:

§ 16-3541: When a quo warranto proceeding is against a person for usurping an office, on the relation of a person claiming the same office, the relator shall set forth in his petition the facts upon which he claims to be entitled to the office.

If the facts are sufficient, then comes a trial and judgment:

§ 16-3544: Issues of fact shall be tried by a jury if either party requests it. Otherwise they shall be determined by the court.

§ 16-3545: Where a defendant in a quo warranto proceeding is found by the jury to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised an office or franchise, the verdict shall be that he is guilty of the act or acts in question, and judgment shall be rendered that he be ousted and excluded therefrom and that the relator recover his costs.

And that, America, is how it’s done. This is now the only way forward. And Trump needs to bring two counts in order to get the process started immediately. If he waits until Biden is sworn in, his chances of the new AG, or U.S. Attorney, bringing the action go way down. Rosen and Sherwin might not do it either, but we know for sure Biden’s men won’t. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats are a real party. They NEVER break ranks the way Pence did yesterday. The District Court Judge will have to sit in judgment of the petition’s evidence before it goes to a jury, unless the AG or U.S. Attorney institutes the case. If the Judge punts, he could get overturned on appeal, but it would be much better not to bother with judicial approval.

Biden is not President yet. But he is “President-Elect”. § 16-3501 applies to “a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States“. According to the Presidential Transition Act, the President-Elect is entitled to a massive monetary budget to prepare for taking office, and that my friends makes his status a government franchise. This is why the action can be instituted immediately against Biden regarding his status as President-Elect. Trump can add another count to the action, challenging for the actual Office of President, only after Biden is sworn in as president.

STANDING

The case will be styled, United States v. Joe Biden, and we get a jury trial. If Trump has to pray leave of the District Court to file, and the Judge refuses, he can appeal – with guaranteed standing – to the DC Circuit, and then to SCOTUS. Standing is directly granted by the statute.

In a follow up post, I will do a deep dive on various Quo Warranto cases, but trust me on this one – standing is granted in the statute. § 16-3503 states: “[T]he interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued.” The case law is quite clear that an “interested person” is the person who would hold the disputed office, but for the unlawful election of the other party. This means that, while every citizen is interested in who is President, we don’t have standing. But Trump does, because his interest is in holding the office. You can take that one to the bank, folks. Trump is the only person who has standing.

WHAT ABOUT IMPEACHMENT BEING THE ONLY WAY TO REMOVE A PRESIDENT?

At this point you may be asking whether the quo warranto statute conflicts with the Constitution, which states that the President shall be removed from office by impeachment in the House and conviction in the Senate. The answer is no. It doesn’t conflict, because if a Writ of Quo Warranto is issued against a United States office holder, that person, in the eyes of the law, has never legally held the office.

The Constitution does say that Congress has the sole authority to impeach and the Senate to convict, and that the President shall be removed upon conviction, but the Constitution does not say that impeachment is the sole means of removing all persons from the office. The Constitution must be read as a whole, not in pieces.

Article I, § 8, cl. 17 states:

The Congress shall have power…To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States,…

Compare the wording of Clause 17 with §16-3501: “A quo warranto may be issued from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in the name of the United States against a person…”

When you read the two back to back, it certainly appears that the Quo Warranto statute is constitutionally provided for. The office of President – being in the District of Columbia – is, of course, governed by the federal quo warranto statute.

Let me make this easy to understand: Impeachment is used to remove a President who was legally sworn in. A Writ of Quo Warranto is used to remove a person who was illegally sworn in as President.

A person unlawfully sworn in is not the President of the United States, and never was President of the United State. His holding the office was a legal fiction. And we have confirmation of this in the Senate.

PRIOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT IN THE SENATE

While the Constitution doesn’t provide for impeachment of Senators or Representatives, it does provide for their “expulsion” by a vote of two thirds of all members of each body respectively.  Article 1, § 5 states:

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.

Like impeachment for a President, expulsion is sometimes erroneously assumed to be the only constitutional process by which a Senator or Representative can be removed from office.  But history has proved that false. For example, there have been fifteen Senators removed by the constitutionally enumerated process of expulsion.  But that list doesn’t include James Shields who was removed from a Senate seat in 1849. Shields was removed after it was discovered that he had not been a US citizen for the requisite nine years.  However, he was not removed pursuant to the expulsion power. Instead, the Senate held that his election was entirely void. 

Shields even offered his resignation, but it was not accepted by the Senate. (Congressional Globe, 42d Congress, 2d Session, pg. 222.) Even though he had been sworn in and had served as a Senator until March 1849, his election was made void and the seat declared vacant. The Senate held that he was never an actual Senator, and so his removal is not recorded as an expulsion. You can’t expel a person from an office they never held. Grasp that idea tightly.

The Congressional Globe account of the Shields removal is directly preceded (on pg. 221) by an account of a similar precedent regarding a Mr. Albert Galatin, who was elected to the US Senate from Pennsylvania in 1793. It was later found that he had never become naturalized.  The Senate again voided his election stating that the election wasn’t just “voidable”, but that since there was no way to cure the qualification defect, the election was completely “void”, as if it never happened.

Nowhere in the Constitution does it explicitly state that the Senate may remove a Senator by making a determination that his election was void and that he was a usurper.  But that’s exactly what happened twice.  If the power to remove a usurper wasn’t constitutionally allowed, the Senate couldn’t have voided his election.  But they did. So here is precedent to remove Senators other than by expulsion.  If the Senate can remove a usurper without expelling him, Congress can provide for a usurpation in the Office of President without impeachment. Impeachment is for a legally seated President. Quo Warranto removes an unlawfully seated person who was never legally President.

QUO WARRANTO AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

In Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 544 (1915), the United States Supreme Court interpreted the federal quo warranto statute and affirmed that any office of the United States may be vacated by a Writ of Quo Warranto:

“In 1902 Congress adopted a District Code, containing a Chapter on quo warranto which though modeled after the English statute differed therefrom in several material particulars. The writ was treated as a civil remedy; it was not limited to proceedings against municipal officers, but to all persons who in the District exercised any office, civil or military.

Note that the Court itself put “all persons” and “any office” in italics, as this was the very first Supreme Court case to interpret the statute. Read the case. Understand it. Use it.

QUO WARRANTO AND VOTING MACHINES

The history of our nation includes many instances of the writ of quo warranto being issued to correct voter fraud, election fraud, ineligible candidates holding office, and even honest mistakes, or technical failures at polling stations that led to the wrong person taking office. I am preparing a much more in depth brief on such cases, but let’s finish with one very relevant recent example from the State of New York in 2002. In The Matter of Delgado v. Sunderland, 97 N.Y.2d 420 (2002), 767 N.E.2d 171, voting machine error was at issue:

“In this dispute over the November 6, 2001 general election for three seats on the City of White Plains Common Council, petitioner Larry Delgado commenced this Election Law article 16 proceeding by order to show cause initially seeking the impoundment of all voting machines and ballots used in the election, and a recount…He alleged that a voting machine in the City’s 18th Election District jammed, costing him scores of votes and placing Hockley’s election in doubt.”

The Court’s opinion is directly on point to our discussion:

“Supreme Court found, and it is not disputed, that a voting machine malfunctioned in the 18th Election District. The effect of that malfunction, however, remains a disputed issue of fact which cannot be resolved merely by recanvassing. Under these circumstances, the proper vehicle for challenging the results and contesting title to the public office of the purported winner is a quo warranto action, now codified in Executive Law § 63-b (see People ex rel. McLaughlin v. Board of Police Commissioners of City of Yonkers, 174 N.Y. 450). The power to commence a quo warranto action is vested in the Attorney General, to be used only after the alleged ‘usurper“‘has taken office (see Executive Law § 63-b).” (Emphasis added.)

It’s very clear that election disputes come in all shapes and sizes. And we have a long history of statutory law and case precedents for every fact pattern under the sun. Here the Court makes clear that a simple recanvass or recount could not resolve the issue, and that a quo warranto action was called for to determine the cause of the “malfunction”. Therefore, you don’t even need to prove fraud if the voting machines were subject to error.

Also note that the Court highlighted the fact that a quo warranto action can only be brought after the alleged ‘usurper’ has taken office. It’s important here to understand that even if the office holder in this case did nothing wrong, in that a defective voting machine error was the cause of the dispute, the person holding the office is described as a “usurper”. The Court itself put that word in quotation marks.

TAITZ v. OBAMA

In 2010, a California attorney named Orly Taitz petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the eligibility of President Obama. Judge Royce Lamberth held that, because she was not an actual candidate for President, she had no standing. Fortunately, the Court issued two in depth written opinions, but the most important aspect of those opinions is what is not written in them. Nowhere in the Court’s opinions do they state that the President of the United States cannot be removed by quo warranto.

Read both opinions here: Taitz v. Obama, 707 F.Supp. 2d 1 (2010); Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d 57 (2010).

Lamberth also published an egregious mistake that we must debunk right now, because the Court of Appeals decision he relied on also made the same insane error:

“Contrary to plaintiff’s repeated assertions, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held that only the Attorney General may bring a quo warranto action against a public official. Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C.Cir.1984) (citing United States v. Carmody, 148 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C.Cir. 1945)) (‘[T]his court has stated that actions against public officials (as opposed to actions brought against officers of private corporations) can only be instituted by the Attorney General.’).” Taitz v. Obama, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 59.

This holding would appear to deny President Trump from bringing a quo warranto on his own relation if neither the Attorney General, nor the U.S. Attorney, will agree to institute the action. But this is truly a whopper of a mistake.

The statute is uanmbiguous in granting an interested party standing. Moreover, the statute, at § 16-3503, specifically states that “any attorney” can bring the action. § 16-3503 bears the title: “Refusal of Attorney General or United States attorney to act; procedure.” Therefore, this is the section that details the “procedure” for bringing a quo warranto action specifically when those officials refuse to act. It states:

“If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued. When, in the opinion of the court, the reasons set forth in the petition are sufficient in law, the writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the United States, on the relation of the interested person on his compliance with the condition prescribed by section 16-3502 as to security for costs.”

Duh. What the hell was Lamberth thinking? Actually, what the hell was the Court of Appeals thinking? I’m thinking the deep state simply doesn’t want anyone bringing a quo warranto action other than government officials. But that’s not what the statute says, and the main case cited by both Lamberth, and the Court of Appeals, also does not say what they said it said. Let’s take a closer look:

“[T]his court has stated that actions against public officials (as opposed to actions brought against officers of private corporations) can only be instituted by the Attorney General. See United States ex rel. Noel v. Carmody, supra, 148 F.2d at 685.” Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C.Cir.1984)

Actually, that’s not at all what the Court of Appeals said in Noel v. Carmody. The Court of Appeals in that case held exactly opposite to what is stated in this quote. The problem is that the Court of Appeals in the Andrade case, as well as Judge Lamberth in his District Court opinion in the Taitz cases, both failed to acknowledge that the Court in Noel v. Carmody discussed separately, the federal quo warranto statute, and the prior common law useage of quo warranto. With regard to the federal statute, the Court of Appeals held:

“The action may be brought by the Attorney General ‘or on the relation of a third person.’ The circumstances which entitle a third person to the writ are explicitly set out. If the Attorney General and the District Attorney refuse to act on the request of the ‘person interested’ the court may issue the writ on such person’s verified petition ‘if * * * the reasons set forth in said petition are sufficient in law.'” United States v. Carmody, 148 F.2d 684, 685 (D.C.Cir. 1945) (Emphasis added.)

How could the Court of Appeals in Andrade and Judge Lamberth get this so wrong? Both the statute, and the holding in Noel v. Carmody, are perfectly clear that an interested party (a candidate) may institute the action even if the government officials refuse to bring it. They tried to stretch the opinion in the Carmody case, where the Court was discussing the common law procedure, as if the statute didn’t exist:

“Obviously the statute leaves the former common-law principles governing the issuance of writs of quo warranto in full force.” Noel v. Carmody, 148 F.2d at 685.

This simply means that where the statute is not applicable, the common law principles remain in force. The statute is not limited by the common law, but rather vice-versa. In discussing the common law, the Court in Noel v. Carmody quoted from a textbook, and a State of Washington case from 1900, which pre-dated the federal statute enacted in 1902. They used this quote, not to state that a private party was prevented from instituting a statutory quo warranto if the DOJ officials refused, but simply to show the different public interest gravities between a quo warranto for a private office, as opposed to a public office:

“The cases which hold that a taxpayer may not test the authority of a public officer by writ of quo warranto4 are not relevant here. They involve a right belonging to the whole body of the public which can be protected only by a public representative. The distinction has been well stated as follows:5 “In the strictest sense, the usurpation of a public office and the abuse of a public franchise are not, at common law, private injuries, and the remedy by quo warranto must be on the suggestion of the attorney general.” Ibid.

At common law, only the Attorney General of a state could institute a quo warranto proceeding, but as Judge Lamberth is fully aware of, most of the states, and the federal government, have replaced reliance on the common law by enacting statutes that are very specific. And while the principles of quo warranto remain, the procedures enacted by statute supersede common law.

Therefore, neither the Andrade case, nor the Taitz cases, are precedent at all for the assertion that DOJ officials can only institute quo warranto actions. That’s a giant heap of judicial bunk. Judge Lamberth was too busy mocking Taitz perhaps too get it straight, but that’s the most innocent reason I can think of. Lamberth even tips his hand in the prior opinion in the same case:

“Even if the Court of Appeals’ precedent did not firmly preclude Ms. Taitz from bringing suit to challenge President Obama’s right to hold office, the one case that discusses the circumstances under which a private person might be able to challenge a public official’s title to office despite the refusal of the Attorney General or the United States Attorney to act, suggests that the ‘interested person’ bringing the action would have had to be actually entitled to the office herself. Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547, 35 S.Ct. 881, 59 L.Ed. 1446 (1915). Ironically enough, Ms. Taitz could never establish such an injury because—as far as the Court is aware—she was not elected president nor could she be as she is not a natural born citizen herself.” Taitz v. Obama, 707 F.Supp. 2d 1,4 (2010)(FN 4.).

That’s what we call a tell in poker. Judge Lamberth is telling you that an interested person can bring an action in quo warranto, both under the very wording of the statute, and the Supreme Court’s precedent in the Newman case. And isn’t it cute that he buries the lead in a footnote. This is exactly the deep state crap we the people need to expose. The judiciary in this nation are infested with creepy crawlers. Don’t be distracted, deplorables, President Trump can, and must, bring a quo warranto action immediately, so that we can have a jury trial to put people under penalty of perjury.

Buried even deeper is the lead they failed to write, but implied directly: Judge Lamberth’s opinion for the District Court – in both opinions cited above – never says that a sitting President of the United States cannot be removed by quo warranto. Judge Lamberth doesn’t say it, because it’s obvious that the federal quo warranto statute, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, clearly applies to all offices of the United States. Last time I checked, the Office of President was part of the United States Government.

We have never experienced a quo warranto action to determine who is the lawful winner of a Presidential election. Yes, it will be a case of first impression that goes up to the United States Supreme Court. One way or another, SCOTUS is going to to hear this case. It’s unavoidable, since both parties will have standing. The only question is who the jury decides is President, and who is the usurper.

By LD on January 7, 2021.

4 Responses to “IT’S TIME FOR A WRIT QUO WARRANTO, PRESIDENT TRUMP.”

  1. […] 11, 2021) — In my previous post, I discussed a Writ of Quo Warranto – the very statute specifically enacted by Congress to […]

  2. […] Prior research reports are here and here. […]

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