Old Chrysler’s Attorneys Throw Mud In The Court’s Eye: Our Response

On January 15, 2010, attorneys for Old Chrysler from the “esteemed” mega law firm – Jones Day – responded to our Motion To Reconsider the Bankruptcy Court’s Dealership Rejection Order/Opinion.  However, opposing counsel have certainly lost their cool by grabbing mud and slinging it right in the Court’s face.  They did this by playing the “birther” card in a memo supporting their Objection to our Motion while our Motion has absolutely nothing to do with the President.  In fact, we clearly stated in that Motion that we do not contend the Government requested the Chrysler dealers be rejected.

It appears that Old Chrysler’s attorneys are doing their best to distract the Court from the law by raising issues which do not affect the case.  They do this by way of psychoanalyzing the motivations of our clients for bringing this Motion.  I have reminded these attorneys and the Court that 789 small businesses were gutted and approximately 40,000 jobs lost as a result of the Chrysler dealers having their livelihood ripped from them.

Steve Pidgeon and I were very encouraged when we read the Objection to our Motion.  When attorneys as skilled and savvy as Jones Day go down the path of distraction from the cold hard law, they must have good reason to distract therefrom.  That reason is obvious – the law does not support their position and now they’re taking emergency actions to muddy the waters the Court must swim in.

Of course, if the law supported their position, Jones Day would not want anything to distract the Court from the law.  So this is getting very interesting.  Our Reply to their Objection is Docket No. 6270.

John Charlton of The Post & Email has done an accurate write up which includes links to the actual documents.

Phil at The Right Side of Life has also written an accurate report which includes embedded Scribd copies of the documents.

The Law Offices of Pidgeon & Donofrio now represent 76 former Chrysler Dealers.  The number is up from 21 at the time we first filed the Motion.

Steve Pidgeon and Leo Donofrio Admitted Pro Hoc Vice In Chrysler Case.

Steve Pidgeon and I were admitted today – Pro Hoc Vice – to practice before the Bankruptcy Court (Southern District of New York) for the Chrysler case.  See docket numbers 6192 and 6193.

Responses to our Rule 60 Motion (docket number 6132) are due January 15, 2010.

Lead Plaintiff James Anderer On Fox Business News: 12.29.09

Video of James Anderer discussing the Motion to Reconsider filed on behalf of 21 former Chrysler dealers by Steve and I.  This was during “Bulls and Bears”  – Fox Business News, December 29, 2009 at 4:48 PM.

P.S. Have a wonderful New Year.

Leo Donofrio

Filed: Rule 60 Motion To Reconsider on Behalf of 21 Rejected Chrysler Dealers.

The public may now view the Memorandum in support of our Motion here.

The public Docket for the entire Chrysler case is at http://www.kccllc.net/chryslercommittee. Click “Court Documents”.   The Omnibus Motion to Reconsider is Docket number 6132.  It  was filed on 12/25/09 at about 11:15 PM ET. Steve and I have also entered Pro Hac Vice motions: docket number 6130 for Steve and 6131 for me.

The documents are listed in the docket as representing “South Holland Dodge”, but in the papers Island Jeep (James Anderer) is listed as lead Movant.   21 dealers are listed in the actual papers filed with the court.

To view the documents in the court system, click “images” at the far right of the docket entry and you will see the following links to documents:

Main Documen…
Memorandum I…
Proposed Ord…

The memorandum has also been uploaded to SCRIBD

http://www.scribd.com/doc/24515184/Memorandum-Supporting-Motion-for-Reconsideration

The Post &  Email published an accurate report on the 26th.

Our Lead Plaintiff James Anderer on Fox Business News Announcing The Case On Dec. 4th.

Further Analysis of The SCOTUS Decision in POLICE PENSION TRUST, ET AL. V. CHRYSLER

UPDATED: Dec 18, 2009, 1:04 PM.  [Mr. Loeb has commented at his blog to this analysis.  I’m disappointed that he failed to address the facts of the exact language used by Judge Gonzalez in his Sale Order.  Furthermore, his failed assertions as to my report have not been corrected.  I cannot give any respect to his response.  I’ve produced a final comment at his blog and should he choose to publish it, he may have the last word.  But it cannot be disputed that my analysis is accurate as to the exact wording of the Sale Order issued by Judge Gonzalez which placed a prohibition on all stays from the date the Sale Order was entered – June 1st, 2009.

Unlike Mr. Loeb, I must deal with Judicial orders as they are written, not as I may want them to be.  Judge Gonzalez placed a prohibition on all stays from June 1st and for 10 days thereafter.   If that prohibition was legal (and it appears to have been upheld by SCOTUS) then the appeal brought by the Indiana Pension Fund was moot on June 2d when it was brought to the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals.  If that is the case, then Justice Ginsberg erred by extending the stay to June 9th.

Mr. Loeb failed to address the fact that Judge Gonzalez canceled the automatic stay and simultaneously prohibited any other stay from being issued by the very wording of the Sale Order.  (See my analysis below.)  Mr. Loeb – who originally stated that my analysis was poor due to a faulty reading of the facts – has failed to address the undeniable accuracy of this factual analysis which he overlooked in his original reply.

My analysis was dead on accurate as to the facts.  If there is something missing in this picture, Judge Gonzalez will have to clear that up since his order prohibited all stays for 10 days from the date on which the Sale Order was entered – June 1st, 2009.  That a stay was issued by the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals on June 2d – and extended by Justice Ginsberg to June 9th – does not change the FACT that the Sale Order issued by Judge Gonzalez prohibited all stays for 10 days after June 1st.  (My original reply begins below the solid line.)]

___________________________________________________

The following analysis is in reply to Bankruptcy Expert Lawrence D. Loeb’s analysis of my report yesterday.  I respect Mr. Loeb and I have read his Fear and Greed blog with interest during the Chrysler bankruptcy.  Please review his report before reading my response below.

Dear Mr. Loeb,

First off, let me say that I have found your blog very enlightening on the Chrysler bankruptcy litigation.  Thank you for highlighting my analysis.  I am not allowing comments at this time, but should you reply at your blog, I will republish the same here.

Yesterday, I was left with the  feeling that SCOTUS found a technical manner within which to dispose of the Indiana Pension Fund’s appeal that seems unfair but is accurate under a technical reading of the law.

I understand your argument and I would agree with it for the most part except that – whether intended by SCOTUS or not – for the appeal which was brought to the 2d Circuit to have been moot at the time it was brought, I believe my interpretation must be correct.  Otherwise, how could an appeal brought on June 2d be moot on June 2d?

Perhaps the SCOTUS reliance on Munsingwear indicates that the case became moot after June 9th when SCOTUS decided not to continue the stay.  If the case only became moot on June 10th, so be it, and I would stand corrected.  However, SCOTUS did not make an affirmative indication of the date the appeal was moot.

Here is the text of yesterday’s SCOTUS ruling:

CERTIORARI — SUMMARY DISPOSITION
09-285
IN POLICE PENSION TRUST, ET AL. V. CHRYSLER LLC, ET AL.
The motion of Washington Legal Foundation, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.  See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

Had the SCOTUS simply vacated the 2d Circuit decision, I would certainly agree with your analysis.  All these months later, the appeal – since it does not allege a bad faith purchaser – is certainly moot under 363(m).  I think we can agree on that.

However, my analysis was premised on the assumption that SCOTUS ordered the 2d Circuit to dismiss the original appeal as being moot retroactive to June 2d.  For the sake of argument, let’s tackle my analysis as if the order was retroactive to June 2d.

As to my argument, you stated:

“Mr. Donofrio’s analysis is interesting, but I think it’s a poor (if not slanted) reading of the law. Section 363(m) states:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

You then continued your analysis as follows:

But nothing in that Section indicates that ONLY the Bankruptcy Court can issue the stay. It would seem unusual that Congress would intend to give the Bankruptcy Court the right to make its judgement appeal-proof (and doing so would seem to conflict with the role of the Supreme Court in the Constitution). Mr. Donofrio did not cite any cases that supported that theory.

My argument did not allege that a 363 sale is appeal-proof.  I made it quite clear that the statute allows for an appeal – notwithstanding a stay – on the issue of whether the purchaser acted in good faith.  The Indiana Pension Fund did not allege that Fiat acted in bad faith so they needed an effective stay to appeal.

363(m) is designed to protect the purchaser.  If there’s no allegation the purchaser acted in bad faith, there is solid statutory protection.  It’s not too far out to imagine that 363(m) was intended to protect the purchaser from having the deal cut out from under him at some later point in time after the sale had been authorized when he might have relied on the sale order to his financial detriment.  If the Bankruptcy Court stays their ruling pending appeal, then the purchaser is fairly warned.  But if the sale order is not stayed, then 363(m) allows the purchaser to act on his purchase.  In cases where assets are melting, this makes perfect sense.

Furthermore, 6004(h) provides for an automatic 14 day stay of a 363 sale.  But it also allows the Bankruptcy Judge to provide otherwise.  6004(h) reads as follows:

(h) Stay of order authorizing use, sale, or lease of property.

An order authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property other than cash collateral is stayed until the expiration of 14 days after entry of the order, unless the court orders otherwise.

So, here we see Congress granting the Bankruptcy Court authority to cancel the automatic stay by including, “unless the court orders otherwise“.  Congress has therefore allowed the Bankruptcy Judge great breadth and scope over whether the sale should be stayed, and Judge Gonzalez apparently jumped all over that provision.

Now let’s look further at your analysis:

“Not only that, but it seems his analysis is based on a poor interpretation of the facts of the case. Specifically, Judge Gonzalez’s Sale Order (Docket 3232 corrections made in Errata Order Docket 3239), dated June 1, 2009, specifically delays the closing of the transaction to allow for an appeal.”

With all due respect, I do not believe my analysis rests on a poor interpretation of the facts.  While the Sale Order may have delayed the closing, it did not stay the entry of the order.  Here’s what the June 1st Order (docket no. 3232) stated:

57. As provided by Bankruptcy Rules 6004(h) and 6006(d), this Sale Order shall not be stayed for ten days after its entry and shall be effective as of 12:00 noon, Eastern Time, on Friday June 5, 2009, and the Debtors and the Purchaser are authorized to close the Sale Transaction on or after 12:00 noon, Eastern Time, on Friday June 5, 2009.4 Any party objecting to this Sale Order must exercise due diligence in filing an appeal and pursuing a stay or risk its appeal being foreclosed as moot in the event Purchaser and the Debtors elect to close prior to this Sale Order becoming a Final Order.” (Emphasis added.)

That little warning by Judge Gonzalez at the end seems rather cryptic in retrospect since it appears the Honorable Court parsed the meaning of “entry” and the “effective” date of such entry.  Or, in the alternative, SCOTUS interpreted, sua sponte, that the Sale Order could not be stayed for ten days after the order was entered on June 1st.

It gets really interesting when you consider that the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the Sale Order was entered on June 1, 2009.  Here is what the Court wrote in its opinion:

The Indiana State Police Pension Trust,…along with various tort claimants and others, appeal from an order entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Bankruptcy Judge, dated June 1, 2009 (the “Sale Order”), authorizing the sale of substantially all of the debtor’s assets to New CarCo Acquisition. (Emphasis added.)

The “authorization” for the sale was issued on May 31, 2009 while the order was entered on June 1st.  Reading the Sale Order now with the knowledge that it was –  in fact – entered on June 1st, we can see that Judge Gonzalez did – in fact – place a ban on all stays for the ten days running between June 1st and June 10th.

Moreover, 363(m) also provides that not only must the “sale” be stayed pending appeal, but the “authorization” for the sale must also be stayed.  363(m) states,  “…unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.”

Congress used the word “and” which signifies that the authorization for the sale and the closing of the sale are two different things both of which must be stayed pending appeal. This is important because the authorization happened on May 31, 2009 and the order was entered granting such authority on June 1st.  But the sale didn’t close until June 10th.  The statute is quite clear.  In order for the appeal to not be moot, both the authority and the sale must be stayed pending appeal.

The Sale Order entered on June 1st states unequivocally that “this Sale Order shall not be stayed for ten days after its entry”.

If SCOTUS interpreted the Bankruptcy Code as granting the Bankruptcy Judge authority to place such a prohibition on staying the Sale Order then there was no stay available to the Indiana Pension Fund on June 2d, 2009 and therefore the appeal – as of June 2d – was moot.  If the dismissal of the appeal as being moot was retroactive to June 2d, this must have been the technicality that enabled SCOTUS to do what they did.

More of your analysis:

“In addition, on June 2, 2009, Judge Gonzalez issued an “Order Certifying Sale Order for Immediate Appeal to United States Court of Appeals, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)” (Docket 3237) which approved the appeal. Since the stay was already in place under the Sale Order, there was no need to extend it.”

You have assumed here that a stay was already in place when the appeal reached the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals.  But that Court made no mention of a pre-existing stay.  Instead, the Court of Appeals stated that they granted a motion for a stay on June 2d:

On June 2, 2009 we granted the Indiana Pensioners’ motion for a stay and for expedited appeal directly to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2).

Had there been a pre-existing stay issued by Judge Gonzalez, the Court of Appeals should have extended the stay rather than granting it.  And the motion would likely have requested an extension as well.

Now let’s revisit that little warning again from the June 1st Sale order:

“Any party objecting to this Sale Order must exercise due diligence in filing an appeal and pursuing a stay or risk its appeal being foreclosed as moot…”

This will be hard to swallow for many observers and particularly for the Indiana Pension Fund, but it certainly appears that – in retrospect – when Judge Gonzalez warned any party intending to appeal to “exercise due diligence” in order to avoid their appeal being moot, he was making reference to the necessity of basing such an appeal on the only issue not protected by 363(m), bad faith of the purchaser.

Also, in your analysis above, you stated that Judge Gonzalez “approved the appeal” since he also approved the certification of the appeal to the 2d Circuit, but the motion to certify the appeal was made by the Debtor (Old Chrysler).  (See docket #3086).  At that time, Judge Gonzalez had no reason to assume that the Indiana Pension Fund would not include an argument that the purchaser acted in bad faith.  Had they done so, no stay would have been necessary as 363(m) does not require a stay to invalidate a 363 sale based on that contention.  Hence, as far as Judge Gonzalez was concerned, such an appeal would have been proper.

I admit, none of this analysis seems equitable, fair or even possible.  But there is a trend in law and government now where important issues are based on tongue twisting complex interpretations of statutory construction which appear to obviously say one thing but which – under an intense microscopic review of the technicalities – actually say something vastly different and in a language written in Martian legalese and translated by intellectual harbingers of tidy chaos preaching esoteric unholy scripture based upon what the meaning of is isn’t.

Such is the entire mess created by the Chrysler bankruptcy, a true legal disaster car accident of epic proportions.

Mr. Loeb concluded as follows:

Given that series of facts, even if Mr. Donofrio’s interpretation of who must stay the sale were true, I don’t see how Chrysler would have failed that test.

Bottom line, I don’t think that Mr. Donofrio’s interpretation is correct. I believe the Supreme Court didn’t want the 2nd Circuit opinion to be law in that circuit, so they vacated it.

Anybody have any alternative views?

Yup.

_________________________________________

by Leo C. Donofrio, Esq. for the Law Office of Pidgeon and Donofrio

Analysis of December 14, 2009 US Supreme Court Decision Regarding Chrysler Sale.

ANALYSIS OF US SUPREME COURT’S RULING in POLICE PENSION TRUST, ET AL. V. CHRYSLER LLC, ET AL by Leo Donofrio, Esq.

While today’s ruling by the US Supreme Court is bad for the Indiana Pension Fund, it does not adversely affect our clients (a group of former Chrysler dealers lead by James Anderer) in any way.  Our clients were never part of that appeal and the legal issues raised by the Indiana Pension Fund are vastly different from the issues we will raise.  This decision today is somewhat helpful to our case in that by vacating the lower court’s judgment, the US Supreme Court has stripped the prior Court of Appeals ruling of having any precedential effect on our clients.

The US Supreme Court has wisely ordered the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate its judgment below and therefore any precedent that might have been set as to the Indiana Pension Fund’s lack of standing to challenge the use of TARP funds has been set aside by the US Supreme Court.  This was a very wise choice by the SCOTUS.  Had they simply denied certiorari without vacating the 2d Circuit’s ruling, precedent would have been set.  But since that ruling has been vacated, the TARP issue is still very much fair game.

The TARP issue is not related to our pending filing in the Bankruptcy Court, but it will be part of our Quo Warranto action in the DC District Court.

The SCOTUS today gave guidance on this issue by making reference to its prior decision in – United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), wherein it was held:

The established practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in the federal system which has become moot while on its way here or pending our decision on the merits is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss. [Footnote 2] That was said in Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 299 U. S. 259, 299 U. S. 267, to be “the duty of the appellate court”.

That procedure clears the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment review of which was prevented through happenstance. When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only preliminary.

So, the first paragraph above sums up today’s SCOTUS action perfectly.  They vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded with an instruction to dismiss the appeal for mootness.  The second paragraph above explains the rationale.

MOOTNESS ISSUE

I anticipate a plethora of improper interpretations on this mootness issue in relation to our clients’ rights.  So it’s important to explain what the Indiana Pension Fund was asking the upper courts to do.  It was essentially asking that the sale of Chrysler (Old Car Co) to Fiat (New Car Co) be invalidated.

But the Indiana Pension Fund failed to provide the upper courts with a legal argument worthy of circumventing Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code which states:

(363m) The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

This section provides that even if there is a reversal on appeal of an authorization for this kind of sale (known as a 363 transaction), unless the purchaser can be shown to not have acted in good faith, the validity of the sale cannot be reversed.  This provision protects a good faith purchaser from having the deal ripped out from under him.

The Indiana Pension Fund has not challenged the sale on appeal by alleging that Fiat purchased Chrysler in bad faith.  The following is from the Indiana Pension Fund’s petition for certiorari to the US Supreme Court:

The Indiana Pensioners acknowledge that in the absence of a finding of bad faith, section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code proscribes undoing the sale of Chrysler’s assets, and do not now seek such relief.

So, the Indiana Pension Fund waived its right to argue that Fiat purchased in bad faith and they got slammed to the mat today as a result.  As to this issue, the Bankruptcy Court originally stated:

Further, there are no allegations regarding Fiat’s conduct in this transaction that would raise any issue as to the purchaser’s good faith. Thus, New Chrysler is a good faith purchaser pursuant to § 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The sale was authorized by Judge Gonzalez in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on June 1, 2009.  And the protections of 363(m) – as to the purchaser – kicked in at that precise moment.  The statute indicates that the mootness issue relates back to the date the sale was authorized (not the date the sale closed).

Therefore, even if authority for the sale could have been reversed on the grounds of illegal use of TARP funds or a finding that Old Chrysler acted in bad faith, absent a showing that Fiat acted in bad faith – or that the sale had been stayed pending appeal – the sale could not be invalidated due to the protections of 363(m).  Hence, appealing the sale was held to be moot because the SCOTUS interpreted that the relief sought by the Indiana Pension Fund could not be accomplished without invalidating the sale.  I will explain this in more detail below.  But first we need to examine the original stay issued by the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals and thereafter extended by SCOTUS because this is what will puzzle many commentators the most.

THE STAY ISSUE

The Indiana Pension Fund appealed to the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals and a stay pending appeal was issued by that court on June 2d, 2009.  Therefore, at first glance it appears that 363(m) would not render a successful appeal moot in this case since the statute makes an exception that sale authorizations can be held invalid on appeal if the original sale authorization had been stayed pending appeal.  But, on June 1st 2009, Judge Gonzalez did not stay his sale authorization pending appeal.  It was only stayed on June 2d by the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, by the time the Indiana Pension Fund came to the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals on June 2d, 2009, according to 363(m), the issue as presented by the Indiana Pension Fund was moot because it did not allege that the purchaser (Fiat) acted in bad faith.

This is why the SCOTUS remanded the case back to the 2d Circuit Court of Appeals with an instruction to vacate their original judgment and dismiss the appeal as being moot.  It doesn’t matter that back on June 2d the Court of Appeals issued a stay and that the stay was extended by SCOTUS for a few days.  After proper briefing on the issue and time to study the law, SCOTUS correctly determined that in order for an appeal such as this to not be moot under 363(m) – absent a bad faith purchaser – the court issuing authorization for the sale would have been required to also stay their own sale authorization at the time such authorization was issued, which did not happen here.  Judge Gonzalez did not order the sale stayed pending appeal on June 1st.

The Indiana Pension Fund understood the power of 363(m) and tried a novel effort to circumvent it in their SCOTUS brief by arguing that the relief they requested wouldn’t amount to an invalidation of the sale.  But it appears that the SCOTUS did not agree the incredible relief requested could be granted without unwinding the sale.

The Indiana Pension Fund was asking that VEBA (United Auto Workers Union  et. al.) return to the estate a $4.6 billion dollar note and common stock.  But this would have effectively changed the entire sale drastically and it appears that SCOTUS saw this as an invalidation of the sale.  Such invalidation is not authorized under 363(m).  VEBA is now a 55 percent owner of New Chrysler and any attempt to circumvent their deal would have negative effects on the purchaser in that VEBA would have to begin negotiations with all parties again and the sale would certainly be invalidated by effect notwithstanding the lack of a court order stating as much.

So, I agree with SCOTUS that the relief requested by the Indiana Pension Fund would have amounted to an invalidation of the sale.  However, the Indiana Pension Fund was correct to point out that legal precedent exists for other aspects of the sale proceeds to be redistributed upon a proper showing of cause.   Relief associated to the direct cash payment of $2 billion dollars to Chrysler’s first lien lenders would not have an effect on the validity of the sale as that money and its distribution has nothing to do with the purchaser (Fiat/New Chrysler) and does not concern the assets purchased.  Unwinding that distribution is not protected by 363(m).  Regardless, the Indiana Pensioners have already been given their share of those funds at 29 cents on the dollar.

I do not wish to reveal our litigation strategy going forward.  Our clients were not part of the Indiana Pension Fund appeal and the issues we will raise are vastly different and pertain to other sections of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable case law not mentioned in this analysis.  We also believe that the Indiana Pension Fund failed to identify a nexus of bad faith necessary to their case not being moot.  We do not plan on making the same mistake.

Leo C. Donofrio for the Law Office of Pidgeon and Donofrio

December 14, 2009, 1:56PM

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P.S.  Today’s SCOTUS ruling needed to be explained.  Therefore, I have opened the blog up for this limited purpose.  I do not anticipate publishing again until other court decisions are issued.

Wall Street Journal Caught Spreading Blatantly False Legal Propaganda Via James Taranto

Yesterday the Wall Street Journal’s James Taranto took note of the genuine issue surrounding Obama’s British birth by discussing the fact that his father was never a US citizen.  The article discusses citizenship laws regarding the possible lack of citizenship for Obama if he were born abroad.

Taranto prints what amounts to a blatant lie – stating that persons born to an alien father and a US citizen mother could be “natural born citizens” even if born abroad due to a fictional piece of legislation signed by Ronald Reagan.

But no such legislation exists.

This is an evil attempt to persuade Wall Street Journal readers into thinking all statutory grants of citizenship at birth equal “natural born citizen” status as required by Article 2 Section 1.

And with this lie, the Wall Street Journal is signaling that the issue is getting out of control for  the handlers.  They are resorting to desperation by taking journalism to a new level of propaganda.  For that’s what this is – propaganda.  I am really shaken.  I really am.

Here’s the legally offensive passage:

Obama was born before 1986 to married parents, and his father was an alien. Thus if it were an overseas birth, his mother would have to have lived in the U.S. for 5 years after age 14 in order for her child to be a natural-born American. Mrs. Obama was only 18 when Barack was born, so she had not even lived 5 years after age 14.

This is something of a technicality: Someone born overseas and after 1986, but otherwise in identical circumstances to Obama, would be a natural-born citizen thanks to a law signed by President Reagan. (Emphasis added.)

There is no legislation signed by Reagan which uses the words “natural born citizen”.  None.  Nada. Zilch.  But that little fact means nothing to the Wall Street Journal.  What do they care for facts?

Statutory grants of citizenship are needed to rescue persons who would otherwise not be automatically citizens at birth as their birth does not – by itself – make them natural born citizens.  Statutes rescue their citizenship.

The Wall Street journal, with all of its money and access to legal scholarship has failed to explain to its readers that natural born citizens do not require statutes to be US citizens – hence the term “natural born”.  Their citizenship is naturally self evident.

Those who get their citizenship from a statute are not natural born citizens.  If they were, no statute would be necessary.

Regardless, Taranto’s article does much more damage than simply misunderstanding the law it discusses.  The article makes it appear as if the law contains words in its text which are not in its text.  The words “natural born citizen” are NOT in the statute the article discusses.

Mr. Taranto must have some amazing journalistic super powers in that by a wave of his pen he manages to add the words “natural born” to a statute where those do not exist.  But Taranto really needs to go back to Hogwarts because the statute – as of this morning – still doesn’t bear the words “natural born” anywhere in its text.

Here is the text of the law quoted by Taranto:

§ 1401. Nationals and citizens of United States at birth

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:

(g) a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years…

The statute does not use the words “natural born citizen” but the Wall Street Journal has no problem telling you it does.  This is shady journalism at its worst.  If Taranto had simply intended to make a legal argument  that “citizens at birth” are the same as natural born citizens, then that’s the argument he should have made.  It’s not legally correct at all, but whether it was or wasn’t would have been a proper form of journalistic inquisition.

Taranto didn’t do that.  He didn’t make that comparison.  Instead he wrote the article as if the text of the statute included the words “natural born citizen”.  It doesn’t.  And no link is provided to the statute.  So the reader is left to believe that that Reagan signed a law making such persons natural born citizens.

This is truly a desperate attempt at propaganda.  This article by the Wall Street Journal is a portent.  The British birth issue must be getting on some nerves deep in the new Amerika.

Obama Opposed the Born Alive Infant Protection Act And Won The Nobel Peace Prize.

The miraculous inner strength and will to live is so strong with some babies that even despite attempts to abort them, they survive – born into the world, umbilical cord cut… breathing on their own.  Only a few years ago, these children could be left to die – murdered after birth.  The President opposed legislation that would protect their lives.

Obama –  who today won the Nobel Peace Prize – while a Senator in Chicago, blocked the Born Alive Infant Protection Act.  The Act eventually passed in Illinois despite Obama’s opposition.  Please read the full report on this at Citizenlink.  Here is an excerpt:

 

“One night, a nursing co-worker was taking an aborted Down’s syndrome baby who was born alive to our Soiled Utility Room because his parents did not want to hold him, and she did not have time to hold him.  I could not bear the thought of this suffering child dying alone in a Soiled Utility Room, so I cradled and rocked him for the 45 minutes that he lived.  He was 21 to 22 weeks old, weighed about ½ pound, and was about 10 inches long.  He was too weak to move very much, expending any energy he had trying to breathe.  Toward the end, he was so quiet that I couldn’t tell if he was still alive unless I held him up to the light to see if his heart was still beating through his chest wall.  After he was pronounced dead, we folded his little arms across his chest, wrapped him in a tiny shroud, and carried him to the hospital morgue where all of our dead patients are taken…”

Obama opposed Born Alive in committee, but voted “present” — neither “yes” nor “no,” but merely “present” — on the state Senate floor…

“What we are doing here is to create one more burden on women, and I can’t support that,” Obama concluded, and voted “no” in committee again.

The bill went again to the Senate floor, where Obama was the sole speaker against it, claiming that it would impose a “burden” on physicians:

“[T]his [legislation] puts the burden on the attending physician who has determined, since they are performing this procedure, that in fact, this is a nonviable fetus.”

Even though the child lives and breathes on its own, Obama advocated murdering the child.  This is what we have come to, America.  This is the shining face of dear leader.  Where was the so called main stream media on this one?  Why haven’t I heard about this before?  Have you?

PROGRESSIVE EUGENICS – PLEASE INVESTIGATE

Then take a look again at my report on Justice Ginsburg’s comments wherein she stated:

“Frankly I had thought that at the time Roe was decided, there was concern about population growth and particularly growth in populations that we don’t want to have too many of.“

This sick twisted comment was not even challenged by the New York Times reporter who it was offered to.  What populations doesn’t Ginsburg want “too many of”?  Sounds like a Nazi master race angle to me.

I wouldn’t wipe my behind with the Nobel Peace Prize now that Obama the infanticide supporter has been graced with it.  The award has been disgraced and exposed as a propaganda device for dear leader.

FORCED ABORTIONS AND MASS STERILIZATION

I was recently made aware of Obama science czar John Holdren’s insatiable desire to force certain women to have abortions against their will.  This is the same man who advocates mass sterilization.

So much for a woman’s right to choose.

Obama’s zombiecore freakshow vampire brigade must leave Washington DC in shame.

Leo Donofrio, Citizen Attorney  https://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com

John McCain: Citizen of Panama At Birth

[UPDATED 9:32 AM.  See red ink below.]

I’m sick of the partisan hijacking of the eligibility issue.  I want people to know that my blog is not partisan.  From the start, when I brought my law suit against the NJ Secretary of State, I attempted to have her remove the names of both Obama and McCain from the ballots.  Neither is a natural born citizen and neither should be President.

Recently, I was on the air with a certain right wing blogger who alleged that persons born abroad could be POTUS.  Unfortunately, I wasn’t connected to the program until after this bogus comment was made and it wasn’t brought to my attention until yesterday.  It was obviously an attempt to sanitize McCain’s fraudulent eligibility.  I will address it now.

According to the birth certificate and COLB of John McCain, McCain was born in Colon Hospital, city of Colon, Panama.  While the BC states at the top that it is from the “Canal Zone”, the document also states that McCain was born in Colon Hospital, city of Colon.  The city of Colon and the hospital were not in the Canal Zone.

The common story you hear is that McCain was born in the Canal Zone, but these documents posted online do not testify to that.  Furthermore, there is no official document that has ever surfaced which states that McCain was born in the Canal Zone.

There is a birth announcement in the Panama American newspaper which states that McCain was born in the “submarine base hospital”.  I don’t know what the submarine base hospital is.

Additionally, I am not aware of any complaints by John McCain claiming that the documents online – his BC and COLB – are fraudulent.

Regardless, even if we analyze the issue by assuming McCain was born in the Canal Zone, Panama law states that McCain was a citizen of Panama at birth.

Articles 8 and 9 of the Constitution of Panama state that all persons born in the “national territory” of  Panama are citizens of Panama.  Panama has always recognized the canal zone as Panama territory and has always considered those born in the Canal zone or at the Coco Solo base to be citizens of Panama.  So McCain was definitely a citizen of Panama at birth.

According to Article 13 of the Panama Constitution, a person born in Panama does not lose his citizenship unless he explicitly or tacitly renounces it.  McCain has never, as far as I know, acknowledged his Panama citizenship so I doubt that he has ever explicitly renounced the same.

Tacit renunciation is allowed and that means an implied renunciation will be recognized by Panama and citizenship is generally lost when a person enters the service of another nation or becomes a citizen of another nation.  But tacit renunciation could only be accomplished by a person who was aware of the issue.  As a child, McCain could not have made an implied renunciation of his Panamanian citizenship – certainly not as a new born infant.

The Panama Constitution unequivocally made John McCain a citizen of Panama at birth.  If one is going to argue that Obama is not eligible to be President because he was British at birth – even if born in Hawaii – then we certainly must also argue that McCain, who was Panamanian at birth and who was born in national territory of Panama – is not eligible to be President either.

Anti Obama eligibility bloggers who refuse to accept the true legal analysis of McCain’s failure to qualify as a natural born citizen are setting themselves and the entire eligibility movement up for failure.  By not acknowledging McCain’s ineligibility, you provide ammunition for the left to paint all efforts to remove Obama as partisan politics.

I am not interested in partisan politics.  I am interested in the preservation of the Constitution.  Despite being a war hero, John McCain should have been interested in the preservation of the Constitution as well.  But he was more interested in his own career and now he’s directly responsible for the Constitutional hell we find ourselves in because – as the Republican candidate for POTUS, – he alone would have undeniable standing to challenge Obama’s eligibility in a quo warranto action.

But due to McCain having been born abroad, he is certainly not going to come forward and attempt to have Obama removed from office.  In fact, McCain has supported Obama’s eligibility.  How very convenient.

Beware of bloggers who are not lawyers giving you bogus partisan interpretations of what the law is and analyzing it for you as if they had a law license and had taken a bar exam to prove their skills.  They are charlatans trying to spin you.  And they are everywhere, on the left and the right.